vocabulary
one striking difference between Dimen and Frie is the vocabulary -- excess, ambiguity are concpets to think with for Dimen, not even in Frie. Not to mention Marx.
one striking difference between Dimen and Frie is the vocabulary -- excess, ambiguity are concpets to think with for Dimen, not even in Frie. Not to mention Marx.
"osteoporosis of meaning" That's it; that's the annotation.
"I shall propose, first, to replace "either/or" with "both/and," that is, with a Third" (32)"In a power-driven, myopic refusal of interdisciplinary challenge, it validates only two kinds of speech, the dualism of the biological and the psychical. It discredits, in other words, the third term, the social (and by extension the political) which nevertheless slips in on the normative or, what is in effect the same thing, the universalizing.
For Frie, reductionism or reducing (and reification, although I think that's different) are bad, and its always the Freudians or the neo-Freudians or someone else who is doing them, guilty of them, and the interpersonal and cultural are complex and have "primacy" and are done by anthropologists and Sullivan and Fromm. Sounds like splitting to me. As though Frie's entire article isn't replete with reductive statements, explicit or implict, starting with the notion that culturalists are never reductive.
"Thus, it is particularly interesting to note Kardiner’s critique of Freud. Kardiner was well versed in Boas’s opposition to the cultural evolutionism that Freud endorsed. On a visit to Vienna, Kardiner shared his misgivings about Freud’s postulated theory of the origin of culture with his analyst. Freud reportedly replied: “Oh, don’t take that too seriously. That’s something I dreamed up on a rainy Sunday afternoon” (Kardiner, 1977, p. 75)." Always good to be reminded that Freud often knew, and said, that he was just spitballing.
"an opposing conceptual framework: psychology versus culture, private versus public, self versus society, individual versus collective, mind versus context, and so forth" (374)"Because the viewpoint I am describing rejects persisting Cartesian dichotomies between inner and outer, mind and context, it is sometimes referred to as "post-Cartesian" or "contextual," and is indebted to the hermeneutic philosophical tradition (cf. Cushman, 1995; Frie, in press)" (390)Something that struck me from this reading was the opposition of "mind v.
Quotes that I found impactful in answering this question as well as my responses underneath:“integrative psychology, which presented the self not solely as a body, or a psyche, or even a psyche added to a body, but rather as “wahda nafsiyya, jismiyya, ijtimaʿiyya,” the unity of psychic, bodily, and societal aspects.
“It is important to note that such epistemological resonances between Sufism and psychoanalysis were not related solely to the “infiltration” of Western ideas into the Middle Eastern world.
- What does it mean, I ask, to think through psychoanalysisand Islam together, not as a “problem” but as a creative encounter of ethicalengagement?
Shakry’s (2017) book explores the conjunctions and elaborations of psychoanalysis and Islamic thought. Shakry uses 20th century thinkers of Egypt to demonstrate how Islamic traditions were used to think through some of the profound theories of psychoanalysis.